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A B S T R A C T   
Privacy relates to individuals and their ability to keep certain aspects of themselves away from other individuals 
and organisations. This leads both proponents and opponents of liberalism to argue that liberalism involves 
allowing individuals to determine for themselves the level of privacy they desire. If they are given adequate 
information and the ability to choose, the results are argued to be legitimate, even if individuals choose to 
bargain away all or most of their privacy in return for convenience, economic benefits, etc. However, the 
individualistic approach to privacy is insufficient, due to a set of externalities and information leakages involved 
in privacy issues. A crucial aspect of privacy is that it is an aggregate public good, and recognising this lets us see 
why government intervention is both beneficial and necessary for securing the provision of optimal levels of 
privacy. This conception of privacy enables us to treat it as a good that is underprovided due to market failure. 
The article shows how liberals can justify government interference for the protection of privacy by relying on the 
avoidance of harm, and not on paternalism or other arguments not easily reconcilable with liberalism.   
1. Introduction 
Privacy relates to individuals and their ability to keep certain aspects 
of themselves away from other individuals. As such, it seemingly makes 
sense for a liberal to argue that individuals should be allowed to 
determine for themselves the level of privacy they desire. If they are 
given adequate information and the ability to choose, the results are 
argued to be legitimate, even if individuals choose to bargain away all or 
most of their privacy in return for convenience, economic benefits, etc. 
However, the individualistic approach to privacy is insufficient, due 
to a set of externalities and information leakages involved in privacy 
issues. One person’s self-disclosure will have consequences for other 
people, and thus the individual calculus involved in making decisions on 
privacy leads to suboptimal outcomes for society. Furthermore, it is 
impossible for me to be fully unknown in a world where everyone else is 
fully known. In the terminology of economics, the public bad of zero 
privacy is non-excludable. If the public bad is provided, it is impossible 
for me avoid the harm that follows from it. 
A crucial aspect of privacy is that it is an aggregate public good – a 
good that depends on the combined and sustained actions of most in-
dividuals in order for it to be provided. For liberals, one of the most 
important reasons for government is the need to solve such public good 
problems, and it is argued that government intervention is necessary in 
order to secure the provision of optimal levels of privacy. Liberal theory 
requires that state intervention be justified, and it is here justified by an 
appeal to pluralism and non-interference, and not on paternalism or 
other considerations that can be considered inimical to certain varieties 
of liberal theory. A liberal argument for government intervention and 
coercion in order to protect privacy is provided, and it is closer to lib-
ertarian liberalism than to the paternalistic liberalism of Allen [1]. 
The article begins with an examination of the key concepts involved 
and existing literature on privacy and surveillance. Then a discussion of 
the social nature of privacy follows, along with an analysis of what type 
of public good privacy is. Lastly, the need for government intervention 
in order to ensure the provision of optimal levels of privacy is examined, 
and it is shown that this intervention is not in conflict with liberal 
theory. 
2. Privacy, technology, and the government 
Before embarking on the quest to discover the nature of liberal pri-
vacy, a basic set of concepts must be established. What is privacy, how 
does surveillance relate to this, and how do new technologies challenge 
privacy and change surveillance? 
2.1. Privacy 
Privacy is a master at evading definition and has historically been 
used to express many different ideas [2]. As thoroughly detailed by 
Daniel Solove, privacy is a ‘concept in disarray’ [3,4]. He examines 
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various conceptions of privacy, such as the right to be let alone, limited 
access to the self, secrecy, control over personal information, personhood, 
and intimacy [5]. Anita L. Allen [1], on the other hand, suggests that 
privacy today refers to a ‘predictable range of conditions and liberties’, 
both for laypersons and experts. Instead of seeing the concept as in 
disarray, she argues that there are different forms of privacy, all valid, 
that are part of the ‘umbrella concept’ of privacy [1,3]. 
As the purpose of this article is to examine a particular aspect of 
privacy related to the problems associated with treating it as an indi-
vidual affair, emphasis is placed on limited access and control aspects of 
privacy. Limited access is similar to the conception of privacy as 
boundaries, protecting us from intrusions [6]. Scanlon [6] responds to 
Thomson [7], and they both agree that privacy is not a right in itself, but 
a derivative right.1 Thomson [7] here emphasises the right over ‘own 
persons’ and ‘our property’. Gavison [9] was an early proponent of 
privacy as restricted and limited access and, for example, solitude as a 
form of privacy [1]. Control aspects of privacy relate to Westin’s [2] 
classical definition of privacy: ‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others’. Brey 
[10] refers to this as informational privacy, as it relates to the degree of 
control a person has over who has access to their personal information. 
Limited access to the self and control of personal information involve 
two claims: the right to not be observed and the right to control the flow 
of information when someone is observed. Both are of great importance, 
but there is also a tension between the two. Someone might have a desire 
to act in public and still control who observes or at the very least who 
registers and stores information about their actions. People often expect 
privacy even in public, for example when they engage in conversation in a 
restaurant [11,12]. While Tavani and Moor [8] argue in favour of a clear 
distinction between privacy as ‘protection from intrusion and data 
gathering’ and control of information, both aspects are relevant in the 
following discussion of the nature of privacy. 
If we only focus on an individual’s control of information, full pri-
vacy might be achieved in a state of complete surveillance, if this is 
taken to mean that I am simply observed at all times. As such, Tavani and 
Moor [8] are right when they criticise conceptions of privacy that only 
entail the facets of control. According to such an approach, merely being 
observed is not necessarily a problem as long as the information is not 
communicated without consent. Solove [11] argues that observation 
without human judgement is not an invasion of privacy. Only then, he 
states, does surveillance lead to the negative effects of ‘conformity, in-
hibition, and self-censorship’ [11]. 
If we focus on a right not to be observed, the demands of privacy are 
strong. Sætra [13] argues that who (or what) is in charge of the sur-
veillance is of little consequences. He constructs a thought experiment 
with the hypothetical Observer with no means of judging, interfering, or 
communicating what he observes, and argues that this form of obser-
vation would still influence the actions of many. The mechanisms 
leading to the conformity, inhibition, and self-censorship mentioned by 
Solove results from mechanisms in the observed, not in the observer [13]. 
Observation in itself can thus be construed as interference. This implies 
that those concerned with privacy as an element of liberty must focus 
both on the act of observation and the control of the information that 
could be the result of observation [13]. 
In the context of this article, control over who observes and control of 
information derived from such observation are considered necessary for full 
privacy. This implies that privacy is not a Boolean variable with true or 
false as its possible states. Privacy is by degree, and thus not a categorical 
right in the sense that it is something you either do or do not have. We 
can, however, have a right to some privacy and a right to control parts of 
our privacy space. Having privacy involves some withdrawal from the 
public, and Westin [2] states that it is voluntary and temporary and in-
volves both physical and psychological states. 
2.2. Surveillance and technology 
From privacy, the focus is now shifted to surveillance and modern 
technologies. Surveillance concerns observation considered relevant to 
privacy, and new technologies both for gathering and analysing data 
must be understood in order to show why the individual approach to 
privacy protection is insufficient. New technologies exacerbate the 
mechanisms that make privacy a public good, and understanding these 
developments is crucial for understanding why government intervention 
in the provision of privacy is becoming increasingly important [1,14, 
15]. Rachels [16] notes that ‘new social institutions and practices’ can 
change human relationships in ways directly related to the control of 
privacy, and it is here argued that new technologies have profound 
implications for both our social institutions and practices. 
2.2.1. Little brothers in a surveillant assemblage 
Our age is somewhat special in that it is not primarily the government 
we fear when we discuss surveillance. Unlike in Orwell’s [17] fictional 
Oceania, there is not one singular actor that surveils and binds us all. 
There is no one big brother, but many little (and some quite big) brothers 
– a variety of both private and public actors who jointly defy the met-
aphor of Big Brother [11,18]. Governments still gather information, and 
is also ‘an important secondary beneficiary’ of the information gathered 
by others [11,19]. 
However, unless one considers the way in which these little brothers 
act in concert, almost in unison, the overall effects of modern surveil-
lance remain obscure [11,13]. Zuboff [15,20] uses the term big other to 
describe the beast of surveillance, and by this she refers to ‘a ubiquitous 
networked institutional regime that records, modifies, and commodifies 
everyday experience […]’. 
The way many different actors gather information in isolation, but 
then somehow simultaneously act in concert, is referred to as the sur-
veillant assemblage [21]. Haggerty and Ericson [21] criticise the use of 
the metaphors of Big Brother and the panopticon of Bentham, and then 
Foucault, for understanding modern privacy issues. The importance of 
metaphor, and the errors resulting from relying on Orwell’s metaphor, is 
also the subject of detailed examination by Solove [11]. These authors 
argue that the decentralised and dispersed nature of modern surveil-
lance matters, and Haggerty and Ericson [21] use the term surveillant 
assemblage for understanding how a multiplicity of different actors that, 
without coordination or common plans and intentions, still operate as 
functional entities. The unity of the surveillant assemblage is not formal 
or institutionalised, but for analytical purposes it is treated as a func-
tionally unitary threat to privacy – a threat involving privacy’s gradual 
erosion [22,23]. 
Even if surveillant institutions do not operate in an institutionalised 
and collective manner, and even if there is no one Big Brother, many of us 
still have the feeling of being under someone’s surveillance. We can ask, 
with Delacroix and Lawrence [24]: ‘How do we control for this death by 
a thousand cuts?’ Gaining control is exceedingly difficult, as each little 
cut is seemingly innocuous, and we usually do not even know who is 
responsible for cutting us. 
2.2.2. A taxonomy of surveillance 
Before moving on to the role of government regulation some key 
distinctions between different types of surveillance will be presented. 
While the purpose of this paper is not to create a typology of surveil-
lance, establishing an understanding of different perspectives on sur-
veillance helps us see various facets of privacy. Privacy as a concept is 
here linked to protection from intrusions and control of information, and 
surveillance is thus a highly relevant phenomenon. 
Lyon [25] defines surveillance as ‘focused, systematic and routine’ 
1 I do not problematise the notion of privacy as a right, or normative privacy 
[8]. Whenever I refer to privacy as a right, it results from a) referring to others 
who see privacy as a right or b) pragmatically referring to actual legal rights. 
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attention with a purpose [19,26,27]. Lyon [28] also defines it as the ‘the 
operations and experiences of gathering and analysing personal data for 
influence, entitlement and management’. 
These two definitions describe forms of surveillance that are pur-
poseful, which is sometimes referred to as strategic surveillance [29]. The 
purpose could be anything from preventing crime to gaining more 
in-depth knowledge of one’s customers. A broader approach is seen in 
Macnish’s [26] definition of surveillance as ‘sustained monitoring of a 
person or people’. Such a definition allows for the inclusion of everyday 
monitoring with unclear intent and focus. A broad definition of sur-
veillance is beneficial, if one simultaneously introduces a way to 
differentiate the types of surveillance discussed. 
Surveillance can also be direct or indirect [2]. Direct surveillance 
involves the focus on particular persons for particular reasons, while 
indirect surveillance involves gathering specific information in which 
the target and final purpose of the surveillance are sometimes deter-
mined later on. Indirect surveillance is vividly described by Solove [11]. 
He describes a modern form of surveillance that results in the creation of 
digital dossiers – files with personal data – that are gathered, shared, and 
combined in various ways by a multitude of actors. There is often no 
clear reason why a particular individual is observed, and the surveillance 
at times results from the general idea that personal information is 
valuable. Such surveillance leads to a system akin to Kafka’s The Trial, 
Solove [11] argues. Such a system is only purposeful in a general and 
non-specific sense, in that it is a manifestation of the idea that data is 
beneficial and valuable. It is indirect in that we are all targets of such 
surveillance, merely by being potential customers, voters, patients, 
criminals, etc. 
Another typology is found in Sætra [13]. Here, surveillance is 
divided into passive observation, active observation, and surveillance 
proper. In the first, there is no intent to use the information to influence 
or manage us. Passive observation might occur if an electricity meter in 
our home is only used to determine the size of the bill we receive. Active 
observation involves gathering information in order to retroactively use it 
to influence or manage us through, for example, sanctions. Video sur-
veillance at a store, used as evidence of me breaking in, is active sur-
veillance. The final type is labelled surveillance proper as it most clearly 
manifests the form of surveillance referred to in popular usage of the 
term, particularly related to government surveillance. It involves pro-
active use of surveillance in order to uncover information and change the 
actions of individuals. If the government uncovers information and ap-
prehends potential terrorists before a crime has been committed, this is 
labelled surveillance proper. 
It is accepted as a fact that technologies have led to changes in the 
pervasiveness of surveillance, and the technical details of the technol-
ogies used to connect and analyse Big Data is beyond the scope of the 
article. Technological advances have led to the growth of the surveillant 
assemblage discussed earlier, and the data gathered through this sur-
veillance is increasingly used to create personality profiles which are 
used to influence us in a variety of ways [1,11,15,21,30–32]. 
These developments imply that the importance of understanding and 
possibly regulating the market for privacy is becoming increasingly 
important. One reason for this is that targets of surveillance will often 
not be able to accurately identify or uncover whether they are surveilled 
by use of new technologies and the use of the various sources of data in 
existence. Neither will they necessarily be able to perceive which form of 
surveillance they are under. They might not notice that they are 
observed, and if they do, they will often not know if or how the infor-
mation is used. Cohen [19] states that ‘[n]etworked information enable 
[s] surveillant attention to become continuous, pervasively distributed, 
and persistent’, and Nissenbaum [33] writes that new information 
technologies have led to practices of surveillance that are both pervasive 
and ‘among the least understood and controversial challenges to pri-
vacy’. Such a system of surveillance might be highly effective, while 
remaining unperceived and poorly understood by the targets of sur-
veillance. If so, and if the inherent complexities in such a system make it 
difficult to create informed consent by giving notice, an individual 
market-based solution might be insufficient. 
We have now arrived at a concept of privacy as protection against 
interference and control over personal information, and an under-
standing of surveillance in modern society as both indirect and often 
non-strategic. These forms of surveillance, which might be passive or 
active observation and not necessarily surveillance proper, are all 
problematic when we examine privacy as protection against interfer-
ence. It is also important to understand how technology has changed 
surveillance, as the indirect and unfocused nature of modern surveil-
lance has implications for the provision of privacy as a public good, as 
discussed in section 3. 
2.3. Individualist vs. collectivist regulation 
Before examining how policy makers should regard privacy, an 
approach touched upon in the introduction, namely that of notice and 
choice, must be briefly explained. Particularly in the US, this regime has 
been prevalent, and its modern privacy law is based on Westin’s 
conception of privacy as the right to control personal information [34]. 
This control-based approach has led to the idea of notice and choice as the 
basis of privacy regulation. As Allen [1] and Bennett [35] note, the US is 
different from, for example, Europe in terms of the approach to privacy 
as an individual good. Writers focused on the US, Bennett [35] argues, 
fail to fully recognise how other regions have taken a different path, and 
gone for ‘a more comprehensive statutory approach to information 
privacy’. 
While the European approach has placed more emphasis on 
empowering individuals, Tisné [36] argues that the collective aspect of 
privacy ‘continues to be ignored’ even there. This, he states, leads to the 
need for legal privacy standards that take into account the harm caused 
by collective data analysis. Modern surveillance is indirect and 
non-strategic. This explains why an individual struggles, as it is often 
difficult for individuals to prove harm to their individual rights [36]. 
The individualist approach is problematic for reasons already dis-
cussed. If people are informed about surveillance and are subsequently 
allowed to choose what information they share, they can be argued to 
have control. This approach is not sufficient, due to factors such as ex-
ternalities, as discussed in more detail in section 3, and due to limited 
knowledge of the consequences involved. 
The current purpose is to understand the nature of privacy, and the 
specific details related to the judicial, regulatory, or legislative aspects of 
privacy is thus beyond the scope of the article. However, one proposed 
solution to the problem of privacy protection must be briefly discussed, 
as it is superficially related to, but in reality very different from, the 
propositions developed in this article. It is based on what Tisné [36] 
labels collective rights. Taylor et al. [37] write about group rights, and 
argue that while privacy used to be about individuals and small groups, it 
is now more about larger groups. This, they argue, makes it necessary to 
explore the extent to which it might benefit regulators to see a group as it 
instead of them – of not reducing social units to their constituent in-
dividuals [37]. It could, on the other hand, be argued that the surveil-
lance discussed in this article makes surveillance more individualised 
than ever before, as surveillors constantly improves their prospects of 
knowing you and not just your type. Knowing a person’s type is old-style 
surveillance, developed in part by marketing agencies and others with 
an interest in shaping and controlling behaviour [11]. 
While Taylor et al. [37] and the contributors of the edited volume 
highlight important collective aspects of privacy, a different route to-
wards seeking an improved understanding of the problem at hand is here 
taken. It is a liberal route aimed at maintaining that individual rights are 
all there is, and that the government should not deal with us on the basis 
of our gender, religion, occupation, etc. While existing individual-based 
approaches to privacy have failed, that is because we have failed to see 
the nature of privacy as a public good, prone to market failure. 
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3. Common goods, public interest, and public goods 
It is time to consider what type of public good privacy really is. 
Privacy, Richards and Hartzog [38] argue, ‘is only occasionally con-
ceptualised as a group or even a social project’, which implies that the 
individualist approach to the concept is still dominant. This is the case 
particularly in the US, as we have seen in the discussion of the notice and 
choice regime as opposed to, for example, a more comprehensive Eu-
ropean approach. Even if Westin [2] is at times portrayed as the origi-
nator of the individualised approach to privacy, he states in Westin [39] 
that privacy is ‘a social good in democratic societies, requiring contin-
uous support from the enlightened public’. Others have also emphasised 
the non-individual – or social – aspects of privacy, but there is much 
disagreement as to what this entails and what type of good privacy really 
is – or should be considered to be. 
The social nature of privacy can be understood in a number of ways. 
First, there is the sense that privacy is something that is appreciated by a 
group. It is not only beneficial for individuals, but also for the groups 
individuals belong to. While related to the idea of group privacy discussed 
in Taylor et al. [37], this aspect of privacy is referred to by the term 
common good, which is discussed in more detail in section 3.1. 
A quite different form of analysing privacy is to use the term public 
good from economic literature. This approach lets us emphasise and 
understand how it is possible to consider privacy an individual good in 
the sense that it relates to an individual’s control and protection from 
intrusion, while still showing how market dynamics lead to what we 
label suboptimal outcomes. This relates to network effects of privacy, 
which are for now illustrated by the adage: tell me who your friends are, 
and I will tell you who you are [40]. 
In the following, a set of examples of how the terms common and 
public goods are used in the literature on privacy is presented. Firstly, it 
is shown how authors use the terms in ways referring to common goods, 
before the focus is shifted to what economists call public goods. After the 
terminology and concept of a public good from economic theory is 
established, different types of public goods are presented, and it is shown 
that privacy is the type referred to as an aggregate public good [41]. 
3.1. Privacy as a common good and the public interest 
The social dimensions of privacy are emphasised in a recent edited 
volume by Roessler and Mokrosinska [42]. They argue that the indi-
vidual interests and rights are at the core of ‘contemporary privacy 
scholarship’, and that this perspective is ill-suited to account for con-
cerns raised by new technologies [42]. Regan [43–45] is one of the most 
prominent voices arguing for the social nature of privacy. In Regan [43] 
she notes how while privacy seems to become more and more important, 
it is increasingly often heralded as dead or dying. One reason for this 
paradox, she argues, is a ‘failure to conceptualize privacy in a way that 
sustains public interest and support’ [43]. She explains that being overly 
focused on individual rights erodes privacy, as it places each isolated 
individual’s interests in opposition to social interests and values. While 
societal values, such as fraud detection, effective policing, etc., are easily 
understood and considered to be good, privacy is seen as an individual 
interest that is in opposition to these [46]. Solove [4] similarly argues 
that privacy is an abstract term that is more difficult to explain and 
garner support for than, for example, innovation and security. 
However, in modern societies, privacy concerns ‘cross the boundary 
between public and private’, as it relates to individual, group, and so-
cietal relations and affects core social mechanisms such as ‘friendship, 
love, and trust’, which have great implications for society as a whole 
[43]. Here, Regan [43] distinguishes between three ways of conceptu-
alizing the social nature of privacy. First, it can be a common value, in 
that we all value privacy in some sense. Second, it is a public value, as the 
value is not limited to individuals, but is applicable to our societies and 
political systems in general. Third, she mentions the notion of collective 
value, which is a basis ‘for the social importance of privacy [as] derived 
from the theoretical literature in economics’. This is the concept referred 
to as a public good in this article, and it relates to how ‘technology and 
market forces are making it hard for any one person to have privacy 
without all persons having a similar minimum level of privacy’ [43]. 
Before examining the third type of value in more detail, a couple 
examples of how the three different terms are often conflated or 
confused in discussions of privacy is in order. Lane et al. [47], for 
example, discuss privacy and the ‘public good’, but they here refer to 
common goods such as improved public services, etc., which are not 
public goods in the sense used in this article and in economic theory. 
Similarly, Pullman, et al. [46] discuss how certain ‘public goods’ such as 
biobanks for research are related to the private good of privacy. The 
public, they say, ‘view biobanks as a public good and as such are not as 
concerned about their individual privacy’ as they are with the public 
benefits. 
3.2. Privacy as a public good 
The preceding examples relate to privacy as a social good in the sense 
that they are good things for society, that most people appreciate, what 
Regan [43] calls public and common values. This version of a ‘public 
good’ is not what is referred to in this article. When the term common 
good is used, it is often to illustrate the difference between private in-
terests and the public good; the nuisance that individuals experience is, 
for example, outweighed by the public good. Analysing privacy as a 
common or public value involves normative theory, and in the following 
we turn to economic theory and privacy as a public good, or what Regan 
[43] calls collective value. We might, however, note that seeing privacy 
as an economic public good does not necessarily imply advocacy for more 
individual privacy and stronger regulation. Daughety and Reinganum 
[48] analyse privacy as a public good, but they mainly focus on how too 
much privacy may lead to what in economics are known as public bads, 
in the sense that useful information is concealed and becomes unavai-
lable to other actors. 
Public goods are defined as non-excludable and non-rival. Once the 
good is provided, no one can be prevented from enjoying the good, and 
neither will one actor’s use of the good impact other potential users’ 
ability to enjoy the good [41]. Commonly used examples of such goods 
are lighthouses, a national defence, and clean air. While theoretical 
non-excludability might be of interest, Papacharissi [49] shows why 
actual access to a good also matters. With a notice-and-choice regime, all 
could be said to have a hypothetical access to privacy. However, indi-
vidual management of privacy requires ‘a level of computer literacy that 
is inaccessible to most’ [49]. Nissenbaum [50] similarly notes that the 
‘fundamental flaw’ in the notice and choice regime is the assumption 
that people ‘can understand all facts relevant to true choice at the 
moment of pair-wise contracting between individuals and data gath-
erers’. One reason for this is that private information says more than we 
imagine ‘when aggregated with billions of other data points’ [51]. 
Yeung [32] details the nature of Big Data, which according to her leads 
to a complexity and uncertainty about future implications of granting 
access to personal data in which a notice-and-choice approach ‘cannot be 
relied upon to protect the right to informational privacy’. In short, the 
surveillant assemblage is a wily beast, and assuming that everyone will be 
able to gather sufficient knowledge to tame it on an individual basis 
seems overly optimistic. 
Such considerations, Papacharissi [49] argues, makes privacy today 
more akin to a luxury good – a good accessible only to a privileged group. 
This relates the discussion of privacy as a public good to the regulation of 
privacy. Ackerman et al. [52] state that privacy ‘forms a co-design space 
between the social, the technical, and the regulatory’ and that techno-
logical innovation must aim at producing public goods. The cost of 
keeping track of the various impacts everyday life has on our privacy is 
too high. Such transaction costs imply that individual market solutions 
become inefficient, and Ackerman et al. [52] ‘wish to shift the trans-
actional cost for privacy from each user to the public’. In other words: 
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privacy as a public good. 
If privacy is to become a good which is actually accessible and useful 
to all, people’s resources and abilities must be taken into account, and 
the government might be required to intervene in order to prevent 
market failure. One of the key insights from the theory of public goods is 
that they will often be underprovided in free markets, as there is little 
incentive to produce a good that anyone can freely enjoy without 
paying. This is the problem of free riding, which is explained in more 
detail below. 
3.3. Understanding public goods 
A key aspect of public goods is that they are prone to what is called 
market failure. When individuals do not bear the full cost of their actions, 
individually rational actions lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes. I 
may, for example, have a preference both for clean air and for driving a 
highly polluting car. I know that driving my polluting car will not 
deteriorate the air quality to such a degree that the air becomes unclean, 
so I believe that I can enjoy both clean air and my preferred car. It is thus 
individually rational for me to buy a gas-guzzler. However, if everyone 
reasons as I do and acts according to this reasoning, we will find our-
selves in a collectively suboptimal situation without clean air. 
This is known as a coordination problem, because individuals need 
some way to coordinate their actions so that they can jointly achieve a 
satisfactory balance between their desire to burn gasoline and for clean 
air. Similarly, individuals in a society must together find a satisfactory 
balance between privacy and other goods, such as ready access to fully 
personalised recommendations and entertainment. One particularly 
famous type of coordination problem is what game theorists refer to as 
the prisoners’ dilemma.2 
But how does clean air and prison time relate to privacy? The tragedy 
of the commons is an example often used to explain the problems of 
public goods [54]. When individuals have joint and unrestricted access 
to common resources, self-interested actors will be inclined to increase 
their exploitation of the resource, as they alone will get the added 
benefit, while the costs are divided by all actors. This, in turn, leads to 
the degradation of the resource. When privacy is seen as a public good, 
where externalities are important, we get the tragedy of the privacy 
common. Each individual will be inclined to accept a slight degradation 
of the common in order to derive an individual increase in other goods. 
For each individual, this is rational, and if only one individual did so, it 
would not necessarily degrade the common. The problem, however, is 
that all actors have the same incentive, and when many act on this 
incentive, the common is significantly degraded. Choi et al. [55] show 
how a market-based approach to privacy, with choice and full infor-
mation, leads to suboptimal outcomes with excessive privacy loss. This, 
they argue, is due to information externalities and coordination failure – 
key characteristics of public good problems. It will first be shown how 
relational leakages and the use of general personality profiles create the 
conditions of a public good. 
3.3.1. Relational leakages 
Understanding externalities is crucial for understanding public goods. 
Externalities refer to a situation in which my actions have consequences 
for others. One example could be the pollution from a factory. Without 
any regulation of emissions, the factory owner’s budget would not 
accurately reflect the cost others have to pay for his polluting activities, 
which would lead him to produce and pollute more than he would have 
done had he been required to take account of these external costs. An 
important privacy externality is that one individual’s disclosed infor-
mation can be used to infer information about other individuals [55]. 
Barocas and Levy [56] focus on three dependencies that help us under-
stand the types of information leakage and privacy externalities that 
make privacy a public good: our social relations and our similarities to and 
differences from others. The first relates to the relational leakages dis-
cussed here, while the latter two are the topic of the next section. 
Relational leakages are also referred to as the network effect [57]. 
When some people are careless with their privacy, it has an impact 
not only on themselves, but also on a wide range of people associated 
with them [1,43,48]. In addition, it has effects for people both similar 
and different to them. This is the ethical aspect of privacy management, as 
one person’s self-disclosure has an impact on others [58]. MacCarthy 
[59] critiques the regime of notice-and-choice and emphasises privacy 
externalities. When my disregard for privacy leads to consequences for 
the privacy of others, this can be due to ‘information leakage’ [59]. 
Recognising our social natures, we see that information about me will 
by necessity involve some information about others. My relations and my 
social life are part of me, and even seemingly purely private information 
may be used to deduce information about, for example, my spouse or my 
friends. Knowledge of me involves knowledge of my relations [51]. 
Even if one of my friends does not have a profile in social networks, 
surveillance agents might create ‘shadow profiles’ for non-members, in 
order to (a) prepare their entry into the network and (b) better model the 
full social network, in order to improve their understanding of the ac-
tions of all involved [60,61]. 
3.3.2. General profiles 
Another aspect that makes privacy public is how the aggregation of 
various personal information lets the surveillance agents build highly 
detailed generic profiles. When enough people like me willingly provide 
information about themselves, this information can subsequently be 
used to better understand and target me. This is related to the calls for 
group privacy, as knowledge of a group can be used to effectively target 
individuals in the group [37]. 
No one can ever be fully private, so there is always the option of 
superimposing highly detailed profiles onto individuals about which the 
surveillers only have information about a limited set of variables. We 
might be unique, but we are also alike enough for this to be a problem. 
Fairfield and Engel [51] use the example of deriving the chances of me 
getting cancer by using information about my brother. Even if we had no 
actual social relations, similarities mean I am potentially hurt by his 
self-disclosure, for example by having to pay a higher premium on my 
insurance. 
It is, in short, impossible for me to be fully unknown in a world where 
everyone else is fully known. In public good terms, the public bad of zero 
privacy is also non-excludable. If the public bad is provided, it is 
impossible for me avoid the harm that follow from it. 
Morozov [58] mentions how my disclosure to an insurance company 
may subsequently harm other clients, ‘many of them less well off’. In-
surance is a particularly good example of an industry in which com-
panies have a strong interest to identify those most likely to need 
insurance. If these can be identified and the proper premiums charged in 
a more targeted manner, the premiums for other clients would fall. This 
will arguably lead to a situation in which, for example, those most likely 
to have health problems will pay the highest premiums. If we consider 
that health problems are also correlated with other socio-economic 
challenges, we see how the least well off might be made even worse 
off by decreased levels of privacy. 
Furthermore, there is a slippery-slope argument involved in, for 
example, allowing companies access to our fitness trackers or GPS sys-
tems: when enough early adopters do so, the rest of us’ will be consid-
ered deviants with something to hide’ [58]. Not providing information 
could, for example, be seen as a sign of ‘guilt’ and lead to higher pre-
miums. This would be akin to insurance companies demanding a pre-
mium for clients without smoke alarms in their homes, etc. Morozov 
[58] argues that these considerations make it clear that privacy ques-
tions are not only about ‘pure economic self-interest’. They are moral 
questions [58]. 
2 See Kuhn [53] for a detailed analysis of this example. 
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3.4. Privacy as an aggregate public good 
Having established that there are good reasons to examine privacy as 
a public good, it becomes important to examine what type of public good 
it is. This is an aspect of privacy as a public good that is not sufficiently 
examined, and a framework for public goods and a classification of 
privacy as a public good is here proposed. Brunton and Nissenbaum [62] 
ask: ‘Can your obfuscation project be carried out effectively by one 
person, or does it require collective action?’ This is related to what sort 
of public good privacy really is. 
Barrett [41] has developed a typology of public goods related to 
global public goods such as environmental challenges, and privacy can 
be categorised as an aggregate good in Barrett’s terms. In the following 
quote, he explains the core idea of the concept: 
Imagine a group of rowers trying to propel a boat. Their speed de-
pends not on the weakest rower, nor on the strongest, but on the 
efforts of all the rowers. Some global public goods likewise depend 
on the total efforts of all countries. Environmental issues are typically 
of this type. Pollution is determined by aggregate emissions, over- 
fishing by the fishing efforts of all countries [41]. 
The prime example of an aggregate public good is climate change, and 
this is a better parallel to privacy than one might first assume. There are 
four reasons, Barrett [41] argues, why the optimal provision of aggre-
gate public goods are hard to achieve. First, the dangers involved are 
somewhat diffuse and not immediate. Second, the consequences are 
different for different actors. Some will be harmed by a lack of privacy, 
while others will benefit. With climate change, the worst off are the ones 
least equipped to combat the problem. The same might be the case for a 
loss of privacy. Third, protecting privacy will have consequences for our 
political and economic systems, and we must be prepared to forego 
certain opportunities for economic growth and innovation. Finally, and 
centrally, protecting privacy requires the aggregate effort of the actors 
involved. It is an essential feature of this type of public good that it does 
not require that all participate – only that enough do. 
The other main types of goods in Barrett’s [41] framework are single 
best effort and weakest link goods. If a good is of the type single best effort, 
one powerful agent may solve the problem singlehandedly, for example 
the US alone preventing an asteroid from destroying the earth [41]. The 
weakest link good requires all to participate for the good to be provided. 
The eradication of disease through, for example, vaccination programs, 
is an example [41]. Privacy is a good of the aggregate type, as no single 
actor can solve it alone but it does not require all to take part in its 
provision. Privacy as a public good is provided to the degree that most, or 
at the very least the most influential, actors actively take part in its 
provision. 
Barrett [41] emphasises one problem with aggregate public goods, 
which might not be as prevalent with regard to privacy as it is with 
regard to, for example, combatting climate change: the incentives to free 
ride. Since full participation in solving the problem is not required, some 
could have the incentive to shirk – to not take part in the provision of the 
good – while still enjoying the benefits. This is particularly relevant 
because privacy is often unpopular, and many will gladly trade it for 
other goods when given the chance [1]. 
How does free riding impact the protection of privacy? First, if one 
individual is careless with their own personal information while others 
are careful, the harm that befalls the careless individual is less than it 
would have been if all were careless. The general personality profiles 
would not be as effective, and the incentives to build systems that exploit 
personal information in the way described by Zuboff [15] might not 
exist. However, the benefits to the free rider that derive from sharing 
information would also be less than they would have been if all shared 
their information, due to the same systems of producing value from 
information not being created. Free riding does not seem to be the major 
problem involved in the provision of privacy as a public good. 
Diffuse effects and consequences, combined with limited individual 
attention and processing, seem to the be two most important factors that 
explain why we fail to provide the public good of optimal levels of 
privacy. The main factor, however, could be the uneven division of harm 
and benefit involved. Certain structures of harm and benefit give rise to 
rent seeking behaviour, which is highly relevant to the issue of data 
protection. Whenever a market is not fully free, a competition for in-
fluence over whomever controls a market begins. Competition for 
favourable regulation, for example, is called seeking rents and is often 
(but not necessarily) associated with corruption, bribery, and outcomes 
that are not beneficial for society as a whole [41,63]. The ones with the 
most to gain have a great interest in combatting any regulation of 
government involvement that will change the current privacy regime. 
The people harmed, however, are many, and as each bears a relatively 
small burden of the cost, they will not have the same incentives to 
mobilise and act. This implies that tougher regulation and other forms of 
government intervention will be fought by those with much to lose. As 
Zuboff [15] shows, some have a lot to lose, as there is great value in our 
information. 
In short, privacy is an aggregate public good, which is highly sus-
ceptible to market failure if privacy concerns are left to individuals and a 
free market for privacy. This implies that unregulated markets for pri-
vacy will not be able to provide collectively optimal levels of the good. 
When individuals attempt to individually optimise their privacy levels, 
the result on a collective level will that too little of the public good is 
provided. This explains the need for coordination and government 
intervention. 
4. Government and the provision of public goods 
Individuals do not always care or recognize that their privacy is 
important; privacy is so valuable that individuals must sometimes be 
forced to accept it for the good it does them or others [64]. 
What are the implications of understanding privacy as an aggregate 
public good? First of all, a major reason for government intervention is 
the need to solve coordination problems and prisoner’s dilemma- 
situations [65]. Privacy is such a problem. While some, such as Fair-
field and Engel [51], focus on individual’s choices related to privacy, it is 
also important to have an eye on the organisations involved in surveil-
lance. The organisations that are involved ‘in the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information’ become the targets of regulation, as 
the government aims to create a market for privacy that is conducive to 
desirable overall levels – or optimal levels – of privacy in any given so-
ciety [34]. As Hirsch [34] notes, stronger regulation should not be seen 
as a detriment to these organisations. It is in their interests, as well as in 
the interests of individuals and society in general, that we are able to 
establish a market in which sustainable privacy interactions between 
individuals, organisations, and the government are acceptable to those 
affected. 
While most agree that coordination is required to solve the problem 
of public goods being underproduced, not all agree that it is the gov-
ernment that must facilitate cooperation. Fairfield and Engel [51] point 
to the findings from experimental economics, where it has been shown 
that groups can achieve cooperation through the ability to communi-
cate, punish and sanction shirkers, and framing. Thus, they argue, the 
tragedy of the ‘privacy common’ can be avoided without resorting to 
government intervention. Such avenues towards voluntary cooperation 
aimed at producing public goods should, of course, also be pursued. 
However, the argument here developed suggests that the government is 
needed in this case. This is mainly due to the diffuse nature of the harm 
and benefit involved, which means that it is exceedingly difficult to 
inform and mobilise at a level sufficient to achieve voluntary coopera-
tion. Privacy has value beyond what most individuals are able to foresee 
and the government has a duty to prevent new technologies from dis-
rupting the provision of this good. Allen [1] argues strongly in favour of 
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coerced privacy based on paternalistic and dignitarian grounds. The 
liberal argument for government intervention proposed in this article is 
quite different, as it is based on the classical liberal values of pluralism 
and harm avoidance. 
4.1. A liberal argument for government intervention 
Until we know how we can produce such a state all we can hope for is 
to create conditions in which people are prevented from coercing 
each other. But to prevent people from coercing each other is to 
coerce them. This means that coercion can only be reduced or made 
less harmful but not entirely eliminated [66]. 
Coercion is perceived to the be anti-thesis of liberalism. However, as 
the quote from F. A. Hayek shows, coercion is an integral part of liber-
alism, while great care is simultaneously taken to limit the amount of 
legitimate and necessary government coercion [67]. Like John Stuart 
Mill, Raz, in his version of the harm principle, explains why liberals may 
‘employ coercion to prevent harm’ while refusing to employ it for other 
services [65,68]. 
Others have also argued that coercive power should be employed to 
protect privacy. Devins [69] states that ‘some government-sponsored 
invasions of privacy may be necessary to protect privacy from itself’. 
This is akin to the Hobbesian and liberal notion that some liberty must 
be surrendered in order to protect liberty [66,70]. Devins [69] writes in 
response to Allen [71], who argues that the imposition of regulation of 
privacy in order to safeguard liberty and autonomy is consistent with 
liberalism and necessary for the protection of privacy. While Devins [69] 
agrees that some coercion is necessary, he objects strongly to what he 
perceives as Allen’s belief in the ‘possibility of a beneficent government 
able to overcome its prejudices’. 
Allen [1] argues that an ‘egalitarian liberal democracy’, on ‘digni-
tarian grounds’, may use coercion to protect privacy. She considers 
privacy to be a foundational good on par with foundational liberty, and 
that coercive paternalism is warranted for protecting the harms that 
follow a lack of both these foundational goods. Foundational goods are 
‘extremely important human goods … on which access to many other 
goods rests’, and without such goods ‘a nation state fails to be good and 
just’ [1]. Griffy-Brown et al. [72] names freedom, democracy, 
well-being, justice, and sustainability as foundational values for the 
good society, and Allen [1] then suggests that privacy should also be 
included in this list. Allen’s [1] ideological foundation is ‘comprehensive 
deontic liberalism’. She also states that she identifies with ‘libertarian 
liberalism’, while acknowledging that coerced paternalism is generally 
considered to be somewhat difficult to reconcile with this [1]. 
The type of liberalism advocated in this paper is more easily recon-
cilable with libertarianism, and it is based on non-interference and value 
pluralism [73,74]. According to such a position, individuals have a wide 
variety of individual values, and these are non-commensurable. This is 
combined with a fundamental respect for the individual’s right to 
determine their own values and life goals, as long as this does not 
involve the infliction of harm on others [68]. With such a position, 
paternalism is not the reason to protect privacy. It is the need to create 
the conditions in which people can pursue and enjoy a variety of 
different goods and life styles without undue interference that is cen-
trally important. In order to achieve this, privacy must be protected, and 
due to the nature of privacy as a public good, such protection requires 
government interference and a certain restriction of individual liberty. 
The reasons people have for valuing privacy are diverse, and while it 
may be illegitimate to force all to value privacy in a certain way, it can 
be legitimate to protect privacy so that people can individually enjoy 
privacy in various ways. One reason to value privacy is that a lack of it 
can be seen as interference. Being observed influences a person’s ac-
tions, and general surveillance deprives individuals of freedom of choice 
as it constitutes a form of forced participation [13]. Furthermore, ac-
cording to Warren and Brandeis [75], privacy invasions can cause 
‘mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere 
bodily injury’. Privacy is also required in order to restrict the power of 
others to manipulate us and to restrict individuality [31,76]. This relates 
to the republican liberty of Pettit [77], which allows us to account for 
the potential for domination, and not just direct and actual interference 
[1]. 
Allen [1] emphasises privacy’s foundational value, with a particular 
focus on privacy’s role for protecting dignity and autonomy. Coerced 
privacy is for her a form of coerced duty of self-care, and the approach is 
clearly and admittedly paternalistic. Privacy must be coerced for the 
good of the specific individuals that are coerced, according to this 
argument. Privacy cannot be waived, because doing so will harm the one 
waiving their privacy [1]. While Cohen [19] does not share Allen’s faith 
in government coercion, she does share her view on the value of privacy 
as conducive to autonomy, individuality, and personal development. 
However, a liberal need not resort to paternalism and conceptions of 
autonomy often associated with what Berlin labelled positive liberty in 
order to advocate for coerced privacy. Since privacy incursions can be 
argued to constitute harm, the fact that it is a public good necessitates 
coercion on the basis of simple harm avoidance. People’s liberty to 
dismiss their own privacy is not reduced in order to protect themselves, 
but in order to prevent them from inflicting harm on others. 
A classical liberal position based on a respect for individual liberty 
and value pluralism recognises that all are assumed to desire freedom 
from coercion, and this requires privacy. Some will only desire a mini-
mum level of privacy required to avoid the harms described by Warren 
and Brandeis [75], but others will legitimately value privacy as a 
foundational good necessary for their self-development, self-care, dig-
nity, and autonomy [19]. No one can demand that the first group should 
value privacy in the same way as the latter group, but the first group can 
be coerced to protect their privacy if this is necessary for preventing the 
infliction of harm on the other group. 
Unlike Allen’s [1] proposition, the position here presented justifies 
the coercion of privacy not mainly for the coerced person’s own good, 
but for the preservation of a liberal democracy and the avoidance of 
harm. A society that does not respect privacy, and allows for the ‘un-
checked ascendancy of surveillance infrastructures’ cannot, according to 
Cohen [19], ‘hope to remain a liberal democracy’. While Berlin [74] did 
not extensively discuss privacy, he states that the loss of it ‘would mark 
the death of a civilisation, of an entire moral outlook’. 
4.2. Government and technology 
In order to understand the role of government in relation to tech-
nologies, it must be recognised that technological processes – together 
with social and economic processes – constantly change the opportunity 
space of individuals in society [2,65]. Warren and Brandeis [75] plainly 
state that technologies evolve, and with them, our governments and 
laws must also change. Allen [1] shows how new technologies has led to 
what she terms the ‘great privacy give-away’, due both to the increased 
benefits associated with waiving privacy and the obscure nature of 
privacy loss associated with new technologies. The erosion of privacy is 
often portrayed as one of the key ethical challenges associated with Big 
Data and modern technological advances more broadly [14,78,79]. 
With such changes, a change in the government’s approach to privacy is 
also warranted. 
While Downes [80] has noted that there is a pacing problem involved 
when innovation outruns ‘social, economic, and legal systems’, this is 
not a reason not to attempt to control new technologies and innovations, 
such as the growth of Big Data and artificial intelligence. Technology is 
seen by some as a powerful historical force that determines social 
change, and this perspective is known as technological determinism 
[81]. As noted by Heilbroner [81], such determinism is a heuristic and 
not a defeatist position that implies that all human agency and re-
sponsibility is illusory. There are several forms of technological deter-
minism, and it is used both a method for understanding social change and 
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as a descriptive statement about technology’s potential to cause social 
change [82,83]. 
In this article, it is argued that new technologies have clear and 
profound effects on social and political phenomena. The complexity of 
modern privacy makes it particularly hard to fathom and gain control of. 
It is somewhat akin to the difference between an old water mill, 
immediately understandable for most that observe it, and modern 
electricity-driven mills, fully understandable only to experts and scien-
tists [84]. 
Despite this complexity, it is imperative that we evaluate the impli-
cations of new technologies through the political system, and examine 
whether or not these implications are conducive to society’s core values 
and goals. If we as societies do not dare to question and control tech-
nology, we might soon find ourselves in a situation in which ‘[t]he cog- 
wheels have drawn us into the very machine we thought was our slave’ 
[85]. Technology is not and will never be neutral, and it must be subject 
to ‘evaluation in normative systems’ [85]. 
A classical liberal argument for government intervention is presented 
in this article. While a liberal may have a desire for the government to 
intervene as little as possible, all agree that it must do so at times. The 
market is a powerful mechanism for the distribution of knowledge and 
goods, but it is also prone to failure. Market failure in the market for 
privacy is the topic of this article, and this makes the regulation of pri-
vacy a classical candidate for government regulation. 
Government intervention to prevent surveillance may sound para-
doxical in a historical context, but we have already established how 
surveillance has become prevalent and how private organisations now 
perform a substantial part of surveillance. Since ‘private corporations … 
have as much, if not more, power than many public authorities’, pre-
venting the abuse of private power is one of the most important justifi-
cations for political power [65]. This perspective provides us with a 
coherent account of why the government should limit private enterprise 
when it causes harm and interference with individual liberty, and while 
so doing must itself refrain from using the possibilities that technology 
provides in a similar way. 
While the proposal to regulate privacy as a public good gives a more 
active role to the government than other liberal proposals, it also places 
clear boundaries on government action, and it is combined with a 
recognition of the fact that ‘power is corruptible, fallible and inefficient’ 
[65]. We should not trust the government, but hedge and fence its power 
while giving it enough authority to create the conditions for living a 
wide variety of what we perceive to be good lives [41,65]. 
5. Conclusion 
Modern surveillance is pervasive and ubiquitous, and consists of the 
actions of individuals, organisations, and the government. The various 
diverse actors constitute a surveillant assemblage, which poses histori-
cally unique challenges to privacy. Modern privacy entails challenges 
related to externalities and information leakages to a degree not previ-
ously seen. 
Privacy is an aggregate public good and government intervention is 
required in order to ensure the provision of collectively optimal levels of 
privacy, as individual rationality will lead to too little of the good being 
produced. Government involvement is required because the diffuse and 
long-term nature of the consequences of harm to privacy prevents in-
dividuals from comprehending the danger, and this precludes forms of 
voluntary cooperation that are sometimes effective for solving public 
good problems. 
Government has a crucial role to play in dealing with the threats to 
privacy, and it is a dual role. Government must refrain from engaging in 
harmful activities while simultaneously protecting citizens from the 
threats posed by individuals and private organisations. Such govern-
ment intervention is based on the avoidance of harm and a basic value 
pluralism, and not on paternalism and a desire to impose on individuals 
a particular conception of the good life. People’s liberty to dismiss their 
own privacy is not reduced in order to protect themselves, but in order to 
prevent them from inflicting harm on others. 
The exact nature of a regulatory scheme for public good privacy is 
not discussed in this article, and this remains a vital point for future 
inquiry. While technology can be a powerful historical force, so can 
human beings and their political institutions. The power to regulate and 
control technology is sometimes obscured by both the complexity of the 
technologies in question and the professed benefits of free markets and 
private initiative. 
Such a liberal view of technology hands the reins back to human 
beings. Individuals in societies must start their quest for control by 
discovering what types of societies are conducive to their core values, 
and then it must be acknowledged that human beings, through politics, 
have the power to drastically alter the impact of technological innova-
tion on their societies. The result depends on which core values are 
emphasised and how the harm of privacy loss is weighed against the 
benefits of new technologies based on the gathering of personal data. 
While allowing the collection, storage, and use of personal data has 
certain benefits, there is nothing apart from a desire for these benefits 
that prevents societies from severely restricting the same collection, 
storage, and use. These are political questions, and it is important to note 
that not all coercion by government is negative. Even for the most ardent 
liberal, some coercion is required in order to achieve well-functioning 
and flourishing societies. 
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[36] M. Tisné, The Data Delusion: Protecting Individual Data Isn’t Enough when the 
Harm Is Collective, 2020. 
[37] L. Taylor, L. Floridi, B. Van der Sloot, Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data 
Technologies, Springer, 2016. 
[38] N. Richards, W. Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, HeinOnline, 2016. 
[39] A.F. Westin, Social and political dimensions of privacy, J. Soc. Issues 59 (2) (2003) 
431–453. 
[40] N.G. Packin, Y. Lev-Aretz, On social credit and the right to be unnetworked, 
Columbia Bus. Law Rev. 339 (2016). 
[41] S. Barrett, Why Cooperate? the Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
[42] B. Roessler, D. Mokrosinska (Eds.), Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
[43] P.M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 
[44] P.M. Regan, Privacy as a common good in the digital world, Inf. Commun. Soc. 5 
(3) (2002) 382–405. 
[45] P.M. Regan, Privacy and the common good: revisited, in: B. Roessler, 
D. Mokrosinska (Eds.), Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 50–70. 
[46] D. Pullman, et al., Personal privacy, public benefits, and biobanks: a conjoint 
analysis of policy priorities and public perceptions, Genet. Med. 14 (2) (2012) 
229–235. 
[47] J. Lane, V. Stodden, S. Bender, H. Nissenbaum, Privacy, Big Data, and the Public 
Good: Frameworks for Engagement, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
[48] A.F. Daughety, J.F. Reinganum, Public goods, social pressure, and the choice 
between privacy and publicity, Am. Econ. J. Microecon. 2 (2) (2010) 191–221. 
[49] Z. Papacharissi, Privacy as a Luxury Commodity, First Monday, 2010. 
[50] H. Nissenbaum, A contextual approach to privacy online, Daedalus 140 (4) (2011) 
32–48. 
[51] J.A. Fairfield, C. Engel, Privacy as a public good, Duke Law J. 65 (2015) 385. 
[52] M. Ackerman, T. Darrell, D.J. Weitzner, Privacy in context, Hum. Comput. Interact. 
16 (2–4) (2001) 167–176. 
[53] S. Kuhn, Prisoner’s dilemma, in: E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring, 2020, 2019. 
[54] G. Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, Science 162 (1968) 1243–1248. 
[55] J.P. Choi, D.-S. Jeon, B.-C. Kim, Privacy and personal data collection with 
information externalities, J. Publ. Econ. 173 (2019) 113–124. 
[56] S. Barocas, K. Levy, Privacy dependencies, Wash. Law Rev. 95 (2020) 555. 
[57] A. Ramachandran, A. Chaintreau, The network effect of privacy choices, Perform. 
Eval. Rev. 43 (3) (2015) 59–62. 
[58] E. Morozov, The real privacy problem, Technol. Rev. 116 (6) (2013) 32–43. 
[59] M. MacCarthy, New directions in privacy: disclosure, unfairness and externalities, 
ISJLP 6 (2010) 425. 
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